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Abstract 
In a recent paper Ed Lazear (2004) proposed the so called skill-weights view of firm-
specific human capital. According to his theory all single skills are general but each 
firm may require a different combination of these single skills. The purpose of our 
paper is to test Lazear`s model using a large and very detailed data set, the BIBB/IAB 
Qualification and Career Survey. The paper focuses on firms` investments in human 
capital, which according to the skill-weights approach should depend on the specificity 
of the firm’s skill combination, on the breadth of the skill bundle, on the thickness of 
the external labor market and on the probability of separation. We estimate OLS 
regressions and poisson regression for count data. We find that all implications are 
borne out in the data. 
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The Skill-Weights Approach on Firm Specific Human Capital: 
Empirical Results for Germany 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In a recent paper Ed Lazear (2004) proposed the so called skill-weights view of firm-
specific human capital. His main idea is that unlike in traditional human capital theory 
all skills, taken alone, are general. But the particular combination of skills required in 
one firm may be firm specific in the sense that it may be unlikely to find the same 
combination of skills in any other firm. Based on a simple skill-weights earning 
function Lazear cannot only reproduce the implications of the traditional view of firm-
specific human capital which are well tested in the empirical literature, but he can also 
derive a number of implications that go beyond the traditional human capital approach, 
particularly regarding the tenure effect in wage regressions.  
The purpose of our paper is to test Lazear’s model using a large and very detailed data 
set on training and employment in Germany, the so-called BIBB/IAB Qualification and 
Career Survey. The main advantage of this data set is the broad range of questions 
including different types of training, a long list of job requirements, detailed job history 
information and earnings, which perfectly qualify the data set to test major parts of the 
Lazear model. We particularly focus on investment in human capital of employers and 
– following Lazear’s model – analyze under which conditions employers are more 
likely to invest in the human capital of their employees. According to Lazear’s model 
the specificity of the skill combination, the range of the skill bundle, the thickness of 
the external labor market and the probability of separation should determine firm’s 
investment in human capital. We find that all implications are borne out in our data.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we use Lazear’s model to derive 
testable implications on the amount of training offered by firms. In Section 3 we 
introduce the data set and explain how the explanatory variables are built and in section 
4 we present empirical results using OLS and poisson regression model for count data. 
We conclude with a short summary and implications for future research in Section 5.  
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2. The Skill-Weights Approach: Basic Idea and Testable Implications 
 
In the basic skill-weights model there are only two skills and two periods. Both skills 
are general, i.e. they are used at other firms as well, but the combination of skills varies 
from firm to firm. Workers invest in either skill in the first period and receive payoffs 
in the second period. So, in the first period workers decide to acquire a particular 
amount of skill A and B, at cost ( )BAC , , which determines their payoff in the second 
period. At firm i their payoff is determined according to the following earnings function 
(Lazear 2004: 3):  
( )BAy iii λλ −+= 1 . 
iλ  is the relative weight of skill A in firm i, which may be quite different from skill A`s 
relative weight in any other firm j. The workers’ investment problem is to choose how 
much to invest in A and B, given that he remains at the initial firm with probability q, or 
loses his job with probability ( )q−1 , in which case he has to move on to another firm 
with skill weights jλ . So workers choose to invest in a combination of skills A and B 
in period 1 in a way that maximizes their expected income in period 2. Solving the 
standard maximization problem Lazear shows that investment is a weighted average of 
the inside and outside skill-weights where weights are dependent on the probability of a 
separation (Lazear 2004: 7). The intuition is as follows: If a worker knows for sure that 
he will stay in the initial firm only the skill weight inside this initial firm matters. On 
the contrary, if a worker is certain to leave the firm, only skill weights outside the firm 
matter. However, ex ante that worker does not know in which particular firm he may 
get his next job, so he has to make his investment decision according to the expected 
skill weightλ . 
As Lazear (2004: 13ff) further shows that the expected wage loss depends on the 
difference ( )λλ −i , i.e. on the firm being very typical in its skill requirements (with 
weights close to market average) or very untypical (with weights very different from 
market average). The more idiosyncratic a firm is in its skill requirements (i.e. the 
larger ( )λλ −i  is), the larger would be the loss of a worker if he had invested according 
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to the skill weights iλ  in the initial firm. So it depends on q, whether workers are more 
or less willing to invest in the firm-specific combination of skills iλ . Large differences 
( )λλ −i  make it unlikely that the worker will be worth more for another firm than for 
the initial firm. A voluntary move from the current employer is restricted to a small 
number of firms where the difference ( )λλ −i  is similar to the one in the initial firm. So 
under this skill-weights view, it is only natural that the firm would pay for at least part 
of the human capital investment because a worker who later on wants to leave the firm 
will almost certainly fail to find another employer that needs the skills in the same 
combination. Since workers are unwilling to bear the full cost for training with very 
specific skill weights iλ , Lazear concludes that the firm may bear some or even most of 
the cost of these skills. 
According to Lazear’s skill-weights we identify five empirically testable parameters 
that should drive the extent of a firm’s willingness to bear these costs of training. 
 
1. Idiosyncratic Firms 
Firms pay for a larger share of training when their particular skill-weights are very 
specific or idiosyncratic because worker’s are less willing to invest in training the more 
idiosyncratic the skill-weights are. A worker’s loss in earnings when involuntarily 
moving on to another firm depends on the degree of specificity ( )λλ −i , so the more 
idiosyncratic a firm’s skill requirements are, the larger is the worker’s expected loss in 
earnings. Therefore, if an idiosyncratic firm wants the worker to invest according to its 
idiosyncratic skill requirements it has to and is willing to pay for the training (Lazear 
2004: 32). This leads us to the first testable implication: The more idiosyncratic the 
skill requirements of a firm are, the higher is the probability of firm sponsored training 
in (general) skills. 
 
2. Probability of Separation 
Given a degree of specificity ( )λλ −i , a worker’s expected loss rises with the 
probability of separation (Lazear 2004: 7f), so other things being equal he is less 
willing to invest in training with specific skill combinations. If the firm wants the 
worker to invest in its idiosyncratic skill combination it has to bear at least part of the 
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cost. So other things being equal we expect the firms to invest more in training the 
higher the probability of separation.  
 
3. Variance of the Skill-Weights Distribution ( )λf  
However, investment in training does not only depend on the expected skill weights λ  
but also on other parameters of the distribution ( )λf . Given a value for λ  there may 
still be differences in the variance. If a worker is trained in an occupation that is well 
defined, the skill weights should be about the same in any firm in the labor market, so 
the variance and the risk of the worker is very low. If, however, a worker is trained in a 
job that is not within a well defined occupation, the skill weights outside the initial firm 
may vary widely and the risk of not finding a firm that is similar to the initial firm is 
large. Therefore, we expect workers to be less willing to invest in training in 
occupations or in firms that offer jobs that are not well defined, which means that the 
firms have to bear a higher share of the costs in these situations. So all else being equal, 
we expect the firms to invest more in training in poorly defined occupations and jobs. 
 
4. Market Thickness 
Fourthly, Lazear shows that investment in training is determined by market thickness. 
An increase in market thickness is defined as allowing more job offers (Lazear 2004: 
31). A thicker market is represented as one where the worker picks not only one but 
two, three or even more draws of λ , so he has the option to choose among a broader 
variety of job offers. Of course, he selects the job that best suits his prior investment 
strategy. Thus, the result for a worker with several draws can never be worse than the 
result for a worker with a single draw and will very likely be better since he only needs 
one job offer that is better than the one in the single draw case. As market thickness 
increases, investments that would otherwise be viewed as firm-specific become more 
and more general. The intuition is that as the number of offers increases, workers are 
more likely to find another firm or job that requires skills in the same (or similar) 
combination as in the original firm. In contrary, when markets are thin, the worker 
might have to settle for a firm that makes little use of his particular skills or skill 
combination. Therefore, in a thick market a worker is more willing to undertake 
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idiosyncratic training investments and we expect the firms to invest less with an 
increase in market thickness.1  
 
5. Number of Skills Required 
Since human capital investments and skill requirements may not only differ with regard 
to the weight given to two different skills A and B but also with regard to how many 
different skills a person is required to have, the simple model would have to be 
modified by adding further skills C, D etc. The more skills a worker acquires in his 
initial firm, the more difficult it is for him to find a job with exactly the same skill 
combination because each skill adds as another constraint. The worker might have to 
settle for a job that requires fewer skills than his initial job in order to find an adequate 
combination of skills. This is particularly true in industries where the skill distribution 
is strongly skewed, i.e. with few firms requiring a large number of skills and most firms 
calling for only a very small selection out of a whole range of skills. So the worker 
might have to settle for a job where he uses only a small part of his initial skills and 
looses the rest of his skills. Consequently, all else being equal, workers will be less 
willing to invest in training in industries where the skill distribution is very skewed, and 
we expect firms to invest more in training if the skill distribution is more skewed. 
 
In the following we will test our implications using a large German data set on training 
and skill requirements. 
 
 
3. Data 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on a dataset which is a 0.1 percent sample of the 
working population in Germany conducted verbally and computer based between 
October 1998 and March 1999. The data are from the so called “BIBB/IAB 
Qualification and Career Survey”. The dataset was gathered by the Federal Institute for 
Vocational Training (BIBB), Berlin, in collaboration with the Federal Employment 
Service`s Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg. It is representative for 
                                                 
1  Other empirical studies for Italia (Brunello/de Paola 2004) and the UK (Brunello/Gambarotto 2004) underline 
that training investment not only depends on firms’ characteristics but also on regional labor market thickness. 
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Germany and contains retrospective information on the educational and occupational 
carrers. We restrict our analysis to individuals between 16 years (the minimum age for 
leaving school and entering the labor market) and 65 years (the mandatory age of 
retirement for paid employees). Furthermore we exclude all civil servants (facing no 
layoff risk) and all self-employed.  
The survey contains a large set of questions about the workers’ and employers’ training 
activities. The extent of employer financed training is at the heart of our empirical 
investigation. Among other, the survey asks what kind of training the worker received 
during the last two years. As our dependent variable we use the number of training 
measures which were financed “mostly” or “entirely” by the employer. Interviewees 
reported between zero and five employer financed training measures within the last two 
years (1997-1998). In our sample (N=13,604) the average number of training measures 
over those two years is 0,95 - a number well in line with evidence from official 
statistical data of the German work force survey (Kuwan/Thebis 2003). 
In our regression models we use a standard set of control variables such as age, tenure, 
different human capital variables (schooling, apprenticeships, degrees as a master 
craftsman, university degrees), sex and industries in addition to five explanatory 
variables, which are specified as follows. 
 
1. Idiosyncratic firms (highly specific skill weights)  
The degree of specificity of the skill weights is measured by two variables. The first is a 
dummy-variable which reflects whether the interviewee is – in his own view - easily 
replaceable at his current job or not. 59% of the interviewees think that they are not 
easily replaceable. We assume that if a worker thinks he is not easily replaceable he 
uses fairly specific skills on his job that cannot be found elsewhere in the internal or 
external labor market. The second variable to measure the degree of specificity is the 
number of voluntary job changes in the past (never, once, twice or more); on average 
the number of voluntary job changes was 1,59. In accordance with the skill-weights 
approach (and standard human capital theory) we assume that workers only leave their 
previous employer if the outside wage offer exceeds his initial wage. So the worker 
only leaves his previous employer if he receives an outside offer from a firm which has 
a value of jλ  that exceeds iλ  because this increases his income (Lazear 2004: 12). 
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However, higher values of jλ  also mean an increase in the difference to λ  and 
therefore, a higher degree of specificty. In other words, with every job change the 
degree of specificity increases. 
 
2. Probability of Separation  
We measure the probability of an involuntary and exogenously determined job loss by a 
dummy variable that states whether the firm is – in the worker’s view – in a bad 
economical situation (1) or in good shape (0) (mean: 0.19).2
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
3. Variance of skill weights distribution 
In our data set the respondents were asked to report up to 18 different skills that are 
required to do their current job. As a proxy for the variance of the skill weight 
distribution noise in the external labor market we use the standard deviation of required 
skills in 49 industries. We assume that the higher the standard deviation of the number 
of skills used in an industry the higher is the variance of the skill weights distribution. 
Some industries have very homogenous skill needs with low standard deviations. These 
industries, for exemple hairdressers, retail markets, etc., have a low variance in skill 
weights. In other industries, such as precision mechanics, insurances, etc., skills 
requirements are less homogenous, so the variance in the skill weights distribution is 
assumed to be larger. The mean over all industry specific standard deviations is 2.51 
but they vary substantially from industry to industry.3  
 
4. Market thickness 
According to Lazear, market thickness should measure the number of job offers a 
worker receives in the regional and occupational specific external labor market. The 
number of job openings therefore seems to be a good proxy for job market thickness. 
Since it is not clear ex ante which one is the relevant labor market for any given worker 
                                                 
2  Unfortunately, in our data set there is not enough information on the economic situation of individual firms to 
create a metrical variable. Also, a variable where the interviewee rates his personal layoff risk is not used 
because of strong endogeneity problems: Workers which reported low layoff risks were trained strongly in the 
last two years whereas the theoretical model demands for exogenous probability of a layoff. 
3  For further industries see table A1 in the appendix. 
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we use two different variables to measure labor market thickness: firstly, we focus on 
regional labor market thickness and secondly we look at industry specific labor market 
thickness. Both variables are based on official German labor market statistics 
(Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1998). Regional labor market thickness is the ratio of job 
offers registered relative to total labor force per region (Bundeslaender). Industry 
specific labor market thickness is the ratio of job offers relative to all workers in the 
respective industry. 
 
5. Number of skills required 
Workers are expected to be less willing and firms are expected to be more willing to 
invest in training in industries where the skill distribution is more skewed. In industries 
with highly skewed skill distribution we have few firms requiring a large number of 
skills and most firms calling for only a very small selection out of a whole range of 
skills. We measure the skewness of the distribution of required skills within industries 
by the degree of asymmetry. The higher is the degree of asymmetry, the more skewed 
is the distribution towards a small number of skills, the higher should be firm’s 
investment. 
 
 
4. Method and Results 
 
In order to test our hypotheses we apply two different estimation methods to our 
N=13,604 employees in the sample. Firstly, we use OLS estimates with number of 
employer financed training measures as a dependent variable. This variable spans from 
zero to five, meaning that we have six values on a metric scale. OLS results with robust 
standard errors are shown in table 2, 'Model 1'. Secondly, we apply a poisson maximum 
likelihood regression model to account for the limited range of our dependent variable, 
which only consists of very few values including zero but no negative integer values 
(Wooldridge 2003: 573f.). Poisson regression results are given in table 2, 'Model 2'. 
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Since the estimated coefficients of poisson regression cannot be interpreted easily we 
will use the OLS results for our interpretations. However, as can be seen in table 2, the 
results and significance of model 1 are very similar to those of model 2. 
 
The empirical results reported in table 2 support the skill-weights view of firm specific 
skills put forward by Lazear (2004). To start with the control variables the number of 
employer-financed training is higher for men and increases both with higher schooling 
and with the level of former qualifications. These findings, as well as the fact that 
training increases with firm size, are consistent with previous empirical papers on 
training quantities and intensities (e.g. Pischke 2001). Furthermore, we find higher 
employer financed training in East German regions than in West German regions. Also 
a positive age effect within a negative quadratic function is common knowledge and 
consistent with other studies. 
 
The estimated results demonstrate that both variables measuring the degree of 
specificity are positively correlated with employers` training investments as expected in 
our hypotheses. The dummy variable indicating whether the worker is not replaceable 
at his current job is statistically highly significant at the 1%-level. The second variable 
reflecting specificity was the number of job changes. As expected, the variable is 
positive and significant. Also, the probability of separation is as expected significantly 
positively correlated with the firms` training investments.  
 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
Futhermore, also in accordance to our hypotheses, the employers` training investments 
increase with the variance in the distribution of the required skills. Employers invest 
more in training in industries where the skill requirements distribution have a larger 
variance. We also find the skewness is significantly positively correlated with employer 
financed training (standard deviation and mean of the skill distribution held constant). 
Last but not least, the estimated coefficients of both market thickness variables are 
negative and highly significant as expected. If the number of job offers in a region or in 
an industry increases, then the firms’ training investments decrease. Carefully 
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interpreted, the impact of the regional market thickness is somewhat smaller then 
industry specific labor market thickness. 
 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The purpose of our paper is to present a first empirical test of the skill-weights 
approach on firm-specific human capital developed by Lazear (2004). We concentrate 
our analysis on training investments of employers. According to Lazear’s model we 
expect the specificity of the skill combination, the variance and skewness of the 
industry wide skill distribution, the labor market thickness and the probability of 
separations to determine a firm’s investment in human capital. We find that all 
implications are borne out in our data. 
 
The higher the probability of a separation, i.e. the higher the individual firm’s risk of a 
plant shut down, the higher is the employer’s investment in training. Under standard 
human capital theory, this finding is not obvious because given a very uncertain time 
horizon one would not expect a company to be willing to invest in their employees’ 
human capital. 
 
We also find, that the more often workers changed their jobs in the past, i.e. the higher 
the degree of specificity of their skill weights, the higher is the employers investment in 
training because workers become less and less willing to invest in ever more specific 
skill combinations. According to standard human capital theory this result (job changes 
raising employers investment in training) is somewhat surprising because with every 
job change the worker destroys his entire firm specific human capital and is left with 
only general skills. According to standard human capital theory there would be no 
reason for an employer to invest more and more in such a worker. However, analysing 
this phenomenon with the skill-weights approach, there is a clear intuition. A workers 
skill portfolio becomes more specific just because of the job changes. His individual 
skill combination deviates more and more from the average skill combination on the 
external labor market, which leads to higher investments of employers.  
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Thirdly, if a worker is trained in a job that is not within a well defined occupation, the 
firm has to bear a higher share of the training costs. The phenomenon that a more 
precise definition of occupations has a strong positive effect on employer-financed 
training is not obvious under the traditional view of firm-specific training. But 
according to the skill-weights approach, the intuition is more obvious. The worker is 
less willing to invest in training if the skill weights outside the initial firm vary widely 
and the risk of not finding a firm with similar skill weights than the initial firm is high. 
If on the other hand, a worker is trained in a job within a well defined occupation, the 
skill weights outside the initial firm are very likely to be similar to the initial firm and 
therefore the employee is willing to bear a larger proportion of his training costs. 
 
An increasing labor market thickness, i.e. a larger number of job offers on the external 
labour market diminishes employers’ training investments. Under the traditional notion 
of specific human capital, the thickness implication is less obvious, if present at all. 
According to the skill-weights view an increasing number of jobs on the external labor 
market make it more likely for workers to find a new firm or job requiring the same 
skill combination as in the initial firm. So the worker is more willing to invest in 
idiosyncratic training and the firms have to invest less. 
 
In industries where few firms need a large number of skills but most of the firms need 
only a very small number out of a broad range of skills, firms are more likely to invest 
in training because employees are very unwilling to invest in firm specific skills in such 
a situation. As a consequence the employer has to invest more in their employee’s 
human capital. 
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Dependent variable: 
 
 
  
Mean 
 
Standdev 
 
Extent of employer financed training 0 to five trainings  0.95 1.14  
 
 
Explanatory variables: 
  
Expected 
effect 
 
 
 
 
 
not replaceable at current job 
(Dummy; 1=not replaceable) 
+  
0.59 
 
0.49 
 Workers specificity degree 
number job changes 
(metrical) 
+  
1.59 
 
1.40 
 
Exogenous lay-off risk lay-off risk 
(Dummy; 1=high risk) 
+  
0.19 
 
0.39 
 
standard deviation in skill requirements 
(metrical) 
+  
2.51 
 
0.27 
 Characteristics of λ-distribution 
skewness in skill requirements 
(metrical) 
+  
1.39 
 
0.41 
 
regional market thickness 
(metrical) 
-  
0.14 
 
0.04 
 Market thickness 
industrial market thickness 
(metrical) 
-  
0.14 
 
0.14 
 
 
 
Control variables: age, age², tenure, tenure², Experience, weekly working time, dummy for Eastern Germany, male dummy, 6 human 
capital dummies, 6 working level dummies, blue collar and white collar dummy, 6 firm size dummies, 9 income dummies, 49 industry 
dummies. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The Extent of Employer Financed Training 
 
 
 Model 1 
(OLS regression) 
Model 2 
(Poisson regression) 
 
Workers specificity degree 
  
not replaceable at current job 0.0586*** 
(0.0191) 
0.0856*** 
(0.0209) 
number job changes 0.0168** 
(0.0081) 
0.0293*** 
(0.0091) 
Exogenous lay-off risk   
lay-off risk 0.0437* 
(0.0227) 
0.0474* 
(0.0245) 
Characteristics of λ-distribution   
standard deviation in skill requirements 0.5512*** 
(0.1092) 
0.5820*** 
(0.1837) 
skewness in skill requirements 0.4976*** 
(0.1256) 
0.6376** 
(0.2545) 
Market thickness   
regional market thickness -0.0116*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0115*** 
(0.0043) 
industrial market thickness -0.0289 
(0.0186) 
-0.0422* 
(0.0253) 
 
Const. 
 
-1.9391*** 
 
4.8865*** 
N 
Adjusted R² / Pseudo R² 
13.604 
28.39% 
13.604 
13.69% 
 
Significance level: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% 
Estimated robust standard errors are in parantheses below coefficients 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variable “Skills Required” 
industry number of 
observations 
mean std. deviation Min Max 
Landwirt 455 1.828571 2.053593 0 12 
Haushalt 234 1.495726 2.286831 0 14 
Bergbau 199 2.487437 2.407604 0 11 
Chemie 945 3.063492 2.806279 0 17 
ErdeGlas 236 2.110169 2.422532 0 14 
Eisen 450 2.282222 2.386468 0 16 
Stahlbau 402 2.281095 2.187722 0 13 
Maschinenbau 974  3.155031 2.81305   0 17 
Automobil 991 2.691221 2.534113 0 12 
Schiffflugz 86 2.953488 2.068856 0 9 
Bueromasch 82 3.963415 3.048761 0 12 
E_technik 853 3.201641 2.686105 0 16 
Feinmechanik 169 3.213018 2.994371 0 17 
Metallwaren 333 1.882883 2.279051 0 12 
Bau 2096 2.194179 2.265858 0 15 
Holz 441 2.20181  2.330157 0 16 
Papier 138 3.101449 2.940505 0 15 
Druck 241 2.709544 2.321698 0 13 
Leder 36 1.194444 1.527265 0 6 
Textil 319 1.780564 2.183874 0 11 
Nahrung 641 1.847114 2.130514 0 12 
Reinigung 107 1.056075 1.912382 0 10 
Frisoer 233 1.412017 1.645849 0 10 
SonstIuH 1025 2.718049 2.574574 0 14 
Einzelhandel 1458 1.94513 2.207433 0 17 
Kaufhaus 1149 1.890339 2.105283 0 15 
Tankstelle 158 1.64557 1.820184 0 13 
Versandhaus 84 2.285714 2.422641 0 9 
Grosshandel 874 2.866133 2.599087 0 13 
Handelsvertret 98 3.418367 2.651292 0 12 
SonstHandel 351 3.156695 3.07821   0 15 
Post 544 2.615809 2.510642 0 14 
Bahn 253 2.849802 2.250478 0 13 
Reisen 305 2.590164 2.357638 0 14 
Spedition 354 2.358757 2.562222 0 12 
Banken 625 4.1056 2.582309 0 14 
Versicherung 338 4.026627 2.779087 0 13 
Hotel 568 1.875 2.507177 0 15 
Krankenhaus 1790 2.53743 2.357272 0 16 
Arztpraxen 570 2.785965 2.243478 0 14 
Freiberuflerbuer 544 3.680147 2.645524 0 15 
Schule 2256 3.887411 2.808713 0 18 
OeffentlVerw 2739 3.519898 2.716832 0 16 
Verbaende 645 3.29147 2.672962 0 14 
Rundfunk 312 3.173077 2.564069 0 14 
Sport 120 2.075 2.24979   0 11 
Energie 238 3.256303 2.710633 0 14 
17 
Muell 125 2.2 2.729764 0 14 
SonstDienstl 1461 3.101985 2.788652 0 15 
 
STATA 8.1 
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